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Destination-Based Taxation in the House Republican Blueprint
Wei Cui, Peter A. Allard School of Law,
University of British Columbia1
(A slightly different version of this essay appeared in Tax Notes, September 5, 2016)
In late June, the House Republican Task Force on Tax Reform released its Blueprint for tax
reform, at the center of which is a destination-based cash-flow tax to replace the current federal income
tax on corporations. To scholars of international taxation, this is a fascinating development, because the
destination-based cash-flow tax (abbreviated below as “DCFT”) on business entities has been advocated
in the last decade by some of the most sophisticated economists in the field.3 It was outlined as a tax
reform option in the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in 2005,4 and has attracted the
attention of policy analysts in the United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere.5 Yet the House GOP
Blueprint represents the first time that the tax has been promoted by political leaders. Initial
commentators have stressed the capacity of such a tax (if adopted in the U.S.) to reduce U.S. companies’
incentives for international tax planning and profit shifting, and to allow the U.S. to “leapfrog to the front
of the pack” in its tax competitiveness.6
2

In this essay I discuss certain issues that are crucial for understanding the DCFT.7 For my
purposes it is significant not only that an intellectually stimulating idea has been given political reality,
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A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-TaxPolicyPaper.pdf (hereinafter “A BETTER WAY”). For initial reports and commentaries, see, e.g. Martin A. Sullivan,
“Border Adjustments Key to GOP Blueprint’s Cash Flow Tax,” 152 TAX NOTES 303 (JULY 18, 2016); Ryan
Finley, “Replace Corporate Tax With A Cash Flow Tax, Economists Say”, TAX NOTES, July 18, 2016, pp 330-1;
Kyle Pomerleau and Stephen J. Entin, The House GOP’s Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, Explained (available at
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Analysis of the 2016 House Republican Tax Reform Plan (available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-andanalysis-2016-house-republican-tax-reform-plan); Dylan F. Moroses, Tax Foundation’s Score of Tax Reform
Blueprint Questioned, TAX NOTES.
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See Alan Auerbach & Michael Devereux, Consumption and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19579/Oct. 2013. There is also an important body of U.S.
literature that discusses implementing consumption taxation through a cash-flow tax on businesses, either on a
destination or an origin basis. See, e.g., David Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy (Griswold Centre for
Economic Policy Studies, Working Paper 93/Aug., 2003), available at
https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/93bradford.pdf; Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The
International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NATL TAX J. 619 (1995).
4
See Report of the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (hereinafter “2005 PANEL REPORT”),
Chapter 7 (The Growth and Investment Tax Plan).
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See, Alan Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 837,
837-93 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ADS 2010]; Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay,
Corporate Tax Reform: Issues and Prospects for Canada (Mowat Centre Research Paper No. 88/May 7, 2014),
available at http://mowatcentre.ca/corporate-tax-reform; and INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 42 (2014).
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Sullivan, supra note 2, at 304-5.
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For a more extended discussion of different varieties of DCFT proposals and their relationship to the OECD’s
BEPS project, readers are referred to my working paper, “Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical
Appraisal,” available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2614780. Among other things, the paper
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but also that, even just in Blueprint form, the U.S. tax reform proposal offers a number of implementation
details that the scholars advocating the DCFT have previously not sketched out. For example, the
Blueprint suggests that business losses under the DCFT would be carried forward with an interest factor,
instead of generating a refundable tax credit.8 It also states that the DCFT would apply to non-corporate
entities such as sole proprietorships and partnerships.9 Last but not the least, the DCFT is presented in the
Blueprint as part of a package that contains a policy framework for taxing individuals. Examining the
DCFT in light of the implementation details of the Blueprint is not only necessary for assessing the likely
impact of the proposed business tax reform, it may also help clarify some of the theoretical controversies
that the DCFT has generated.
As many commentators have stressed,10 understanding the border adjustments required by the
DCFT is key to evaluating its viability as well as its attractions relative to other reform proposals, such as
introducing a federal value added tax (VAT) in the U.S.. I start off by examining this aspect of the DCFT,
presenting the problems others have identified in a different form. I argue that we should not see the
“perennial question” concerning the DCFT as being about whether it is in violation of World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements. Instead, the question should be whether we truly understand the
DCFT’s potential impact on trade, aside from WTO legal concerns. I identify a couple of ways in which
objections that can be raised against the DCFT have arguably not been adequately answered. I then
examine how the loss carryforward aspect of the Blueprint interacts with the DCFT’s border adjustments,
and how things get even more complex when non-corporate entities are also taxed on a destination basis.
The implementation issues for the DCFT I highlight would not arise if the U.S. were to adopt a VAT
instead. Therefore I conclude by comparing the DCFT with the VAT in respect of the issue of
progressivity, and considering the question of how other countries would respond to a U.S. DCFT.
1. Does the DCFT Create Distortionary Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs?
Much of the U.S. policy discussion regarding border adjustments under the DCFT gives the
impression that a very good U.S. reform idea is hampered by an arbitrary legal rule imposed by the WTO:
border adjustments are permitted for “indirect” taxes like the VAT but prohibited for “direct” taxes. The
rationale for the WTO rule is rarely explained. Since few believe that a distinction with any substance can
be maintained between direct and indirect taxes, whether any tax reform proposal can qualify as an
“indirect tax” seems to be a completely fortuitous matter. According to this way of looking at the issues,
we are confronted with another instance where lawyers erect senseless barriers to sensible policy—or,
worse, another instance where the U.S. is bound by some arbitrary international rule imposed by
foreigners.
But perhaps this way of presenting the DCFT’s WTO-compatibility problem is not the most
helpful.11 Consider a simple example illustrating the border adjustment aspects of the DCFT.12 Suppose
that Corporation Y, incorporated and operated in the United States, produces and exports widgets to
distinguishes between different versions of DCFT proposals, which have led to frequent confusions. See Martin
Sullivan, “GOP Plan Not So Easily Gamed,” 152 TAX NOTES 1060 (August 22, 2016).
8
A BETTER WAY, at 26.
9
Id, at 28.
10
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 304-5; Wolfgang Schön, “Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law,”
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper 2016-03.
11
The following discussion is agnostic about the intent, logic, or structure of this aspect of WTO rules, of which I
am not an expert.
12
The example replicates the cost structure of the chain of production described in the example in Sullivan, supra
note 2, which Sullivan uses to illustrate the import tariff effect of the DCFT.
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Canada. In the terminology of both the VAT and the DCFT, the U.S. is the country of “origin” and
Canada the country of “destination”. Suppose that each unit of the widget that Y exports to Canada sells
for $100 (before taking into account the Goods and Sales Tax (GST) that Canada imposes on imports13).
Assume that this price reflects a cost of $50 of wages that Y pays to its employees and $20 of a necessary
intermediate service, which Y acquires from another U.S. domestic producer, corporation X. Moreover,
suppose that X itself incurs a labor cost of $10 in producing the intermediate service sold to Y and no
other cost. With these simple assumptions, X has a cash flow profit of $10, and Y has a cash flow profit
of $30. In Table 1 below, Rows 1-3 display these stipulated facts. Row 4 illustrates the tax bases in the
U.S. under an origin-based cash flow tax for X, Y and the two in the aggregate.14 Row 5 illustrates the
respective tax bases under a destination-based VAT, and Row 6 illustrates such tax bases if the U.S.
adopts the DCFT.
Table 1: Tax Base under Three Alternative Taxes

1
2
3
4

Sales
Cost of input purchase
Labor cost
U.S. tax base under an
origin-based cash flow
tax
5 U.S. tax base under VAT
6 U.S. tax base under the
DCFT
7 Canadian tax base under
the GST/VAT or a DCFT

Domestic supplier X
20
0
10
10

Exporter Y
100
20
50
30

Aggregate of X and Y
120
20
60
40

20
10

-20
-70

0
-60

0

100

100

Under an origin-based cash flow tax, X and Y’s aggregate tax base in the U.S. is $40, the sum of
X and Y’s profits. Under the VAT, because the production of X and Y ultimately ends in exported goods,
their aggregate tax base in the U.S. is $0. This result is achieved by Y not including the exported sales in
its tax base but still deducting the cost of input purchases (but not labor cost).15 Note that even though Y
gets to deduct the $20 cost of input purchase, the $20 has already been included in the tax base of X, Y’s
supplier. The aggregate tax base of X and Y in the U.S. is thus zero, not negative. What this means is that
there is no subsidy provided to the export: the price of export to Canada simply is free of any U.S. tax.
Finally, under the DCFT’s border adjustment mechanisms, Y would exclude its $100 export sale
to Canada from its U.S. tax base, while at the same time deducting $70 of (labor plus other input) costs. It
thus has a negative tax base of $(-70). The aggregate tax base of X and Y in the U.S. is also negative, $(60), which corresponds to X and Y’s total wage payments. If the DCFT’s rate is 20%, then the U.S.
government must be able to give effect to $12 tax benefit (=$60*20%) in connection with the export.
To complete the picture, Row 7 shows that in the country of destination, Canada, the import from
Y falls within Canada’s GST tax base16 (and the base of a Canadian DCFT if Canada were to adopt the
13

The GST is the Canadian version of the VAT.
This example illustrating the issues of border adjustments does not involve capital outlays or borrowings of either
firm, and therefore the cash flow profits of both firms are as they would be under the income tax.
15
Under the invoice-credit VAT adopted by most countries, this result would be achieved by “zero-rating” exports
and offering refunds of input VAT previously charged to Y.
16
Although this is usually collected from and even nominally charged to the importer in Canada, the point is that
Y’s export sale is taxable in Canada.
14
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DCFT as well). When Canada and the U.S. are considered together, X’s and Y’s production that ends in
the export to Canada gives rise to a tax base of $100 under the VAT ($0 in the U.S. and $100 in Canada)
but a tax base of $40 under the DCFT ($(-60) in the U.S. and $100 in Canada). The difference reflects the
narrower tax base of the cash flow tax, which, unlike the VAT, allows the deduction of labor costs.17
What Table 1 suggests is that, from the U.S.’s perspective, the export to Canada is subject to the
most U.S. tax under the origin-based cash flow tax (which, when firms’ capital outlays and financial
transactions are put aside, operates just like the current corporate income tax). It is subject to less—more
precisely, zero—tax under a VAT if the U.S. were to adopt the VAT. And if the U.S. were to adopt the
DCFT, the export would actually receive a subsidy, if the negative tax base gives rise to a tax benefit.18
The concern that such a subsidy would raise for the U.S.’s trading partners seems immediate. Under the
DCFT, not only would Y recover all previous tax borne by its non-labor inputs, thus ensuring that the
material cost is $20 and no more, but it should also get a grant for its labor cost. If the U.S. DCFT rate is
20%, Y would get $10 of grant from the U.S. government per unit produced, implying that Y’s net
production cost is only $60. The magnitude of the grant would be even larger if the proportion of labor
cost in the exported widget is larger. Intuitively, this seems unfair to the U.S.’s trade partners as well as
distortionary (welfare-impairing).19 A U.S. DCFT can also have the effect of import tariffs, with the
magnitude of the tariff increasing as the proportion of labor cost in the imported goods increases.20
If this intuition is justified, then there may be more sense to the WTO’s prohibition of border
adjustments for direct taxes than the U.S. policy discussion has acknowledged. Table 1 identifies real
differences among the VAT, the origin-based and the destination-based cash flow tax. Labels about direct
and indirect taxes are irrelevant.
DCFT advocates, however, have generally dismissed this intuition. The first explanation they
tend to offer to counter the intuition is that any import tariff or export subsidy (i.e. not just implicit tariffs
and subsidies such as one finds in the DCFT) will only have the effect of changing real exchange rates, if
one assumes balanced trade in the long run.21 That is, any export subsidy or import tariff would be
neutralized in the long term by exchange rate adjustments.22 This is an important idea to learn from
17

The origin-based cash-flow tax (shown in Row 4 of Table 1) also has this narrower tax base, but in that case all
net profits are taxed in the U.S., the country of origin.
18
See Section 2 infra for further discussion of the loss carryforward mechanisms under the House GOP Blueprint.
19
Suppose that the world producer price of the widget that Y exports, before capital costs (i.e. the required return to
Y’s capital), is $60. Y’s production of the good in the U.S., which incurs a cost of $70, is thus unprofitable and loses
$10 per unit in a competitive market. The U.S. subsidy of $10 would allow it to break even.
20
To see this through Table 1, consider what if Canada, the country of destination, imposes a DCFT on the full $100
of import from Y. If an independent chain of production and sale similar to the one depicted in Table 1 took place
purely domestically in Canada, then like Row 4 depicting the origin-based cash flow tax, Canada would have had a
tax base of $40. (Origin- and destination-based taxes are identical in effect for purely domestic transactions without
imports and exports.) It follows that imported goods are taxed more heavily in Canada under the DCFT, with the
effect of an import tariff. See also Sullivan, supra note 2 at 304.
21
For a good popular explanation of this idea, see Alan D. Viard, Keynes at the Border? April 15, 2009, The
American Enterprise Institute (http://www.aei.org/publication/keynes-at-the-border/). For a more detailed
explanation, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati, et al, 1998 Lectures on International Trade, 2nd Edition, MIT Press, at 215-19
(Sect. 12-6, Lerner Symmetry Theorem).
22
See, e.g., David Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy (Griswold Centre for Economic Policy Studies,
Working Paper 93/Aug., 2003); Transcript of the Conference on "Tax Reform in an Open Economy", held at The
Brookings Institution and organized by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center and International Tax Policy Forum,
December 2, 2005.
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economists, but it is not clear that it offers a full answer to potential concerns about the DCFT’s trade
effects. All examples that seek to show that tariffs (or export subsidies) can be neutralized through
exchange rate adjustments assume that the tariffs and subsidies are imposed/granted at a uniform ad
valorem rate. It is this assumption that ensures that the relative prices of a country’s exports (or imports)
are not affected by border adjustments—which therefore can be countered by a single exchange rate
adjustment. But what if the border adjustments are not made at a uniform rate? As the example in Table 1
shows, the amount of subsidy Y receives for its widget export depends on the proportion of labor cost in
the product. Different producers thus could receive different amounts of subsidies for the same product,
and different sectors will be subsidized to different extents, depending on the intensity of their labor usage.
At best, one could see an exchange rate adjustment countering the average subsidy a country offers to its
exported products (or the average tariff imposed on imports). Even after the adjustment, however, some
U.S. products and industries will enjoy residual, above-average subsidies, and others will gain advantage
against imports that face above-average tariffs. The U.S.’s trade partners may be concerned about these
products and industries, even though other U.S. products and industries (facing below-average subsidies
and competing with imports subject to below-average tariffs) are penalized by the exchange rate
adjustment.
Non-uniform tax rates matter a lot to the assessment of the efficiency of border adjustments. In
academic studies of the VAT, for example, many economists have examined whether destination- and
origin-based VATs are equivalent, an idea that involves similar intuitions.23 And they have concluded that
the most fundamental reason why the equivalence fails to hold is that all commodities are not taxed at the
same rate under real world VATs (because of the prevalence of VAT exemptions). Consequently, the
choice between destination- and origin-based VATs must rest on a range of pragmatic (and uncertain)
policy judgments, with the destination-based VAT being preferred in practice.24 Given that the
acknowledgment of non-uniform tax rates has so importantly shaped policy analysis in the VAT area, it
seems insufficient for DCFT proponents to reply to questions about the proposed tax’s trade effect simply
by pointing to a textbook theorem with demonstrably invalid assumptions.
DCFT proponents have occasionally suggested a different mechanism by which the effect of
export subsidies may be neutralized in the long term. Perhaps the subsidy that the DCFT offers to labor
employed in producing exported goods and services may cause the wage in the export sector (and those
sectors that supply to the export sector) to rise.25 That is, in the example given above, the wage subsidy
would cause X’s cost of labor to rise from $50 to $60, and X thus would ultimately suffer losses and exit
from the market notwithstanding the export subsidy. In effect, the suggestion seems to be that labor
claims the entire benefit of the subsidy/grant for wage payments—it bears the full incidence of such a
subsidy. However, the theoretical and empirical validity of such an assumption about the incidence of a
tax benefit on labor is again likely to be controversial. Without justifying such assumptions, it is not clear
how DCFT proponents can dispel concerns about distortionary trade impacts.
23

See e.g. Lockwood et al, When are origin and destination regimes equivalent? International Tax and Public
Finance 1(1): 5-24 (1994).
24
See, e.g. Michael Keen & Walter Hellerstein, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT, 63 TAX L. REV.
359, 363-7 (2010). This may be seen as the obscure and technical intellectual justification of the WTO’s permission
for VAT border adjustments.
25
See Kristen Parillo, A Destination-Based Corporate Tax: An Alternative to BEPS? 78 TAX NOTES INTL 315
(2015), at 320 (quoting Michael Devereux as responding to the objection that the DCFT gives rise to an export
subsidy by claiming “prices would adjust — just like under a VAT[.]’’)
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In summary, even in the absence of WTO legal prohibitions, distortionary trade subsidies
presumably should be viewed as undesirable, just as distortions of corporate decisions on locations of
production and the intensity of capital investments are. The objection that the DCFT may run afoul of
WTO law, therefore, should not be seen as an extraneous obstacle, but as a relevant critique in economists’
own terms. Many economists and policy analysts have objected to the DCFT on the ground of its WTO
incompatibility.26 If the WTO rule was purely arbitrary, perhaps this controversy would not have
remained so “perennial”.
2. Loss Carryforward under the Blueprint’s DCFT
In the House GOP Blueprint, the net operating losses of a business are carried forward, with an
interest factor to compensate for inflation and ensure that the normal rate of investment return is not
subject to tax.27 Thus, generally, net losses in the current period can only offset future earnings, but do not
lead to any cash transfers from the U.S. Treasury. Yet for an exporting business, one presumably has to
allow deductions of costs to currently offset other sources of taxable profit of the business, since the
business’s revenue from export will always be excluded from the tax base. Therefore the export subsidy
(shown in Table 1 of Section 1) comes in the form of tax benefits reducing the tax liability on the
business’ other taxable profit. By contrast, the issue does not arise under the destination-based VAT (Row
5 of Table 1), because any rebate an exporter (e.g. Y) gets under the VAT only corresponds to the VAT
that it has been charged on its input purchase (and which has been paid to the vendor, e.g. X, who in turn
remits it to the government).
The Blueprint’s loss carry-forward approach is one respect in which the particular legislative
proposal has already clarified the past, purely academic discussions of destination-based taxation.
Economists who advocate the cash flow tax (or other similar taxes on corporate rent), whether of the
destination- or origin-based variety, have traditionally insisted on a full cash subsidy for corporate losses.
They have done so for two reasons.28 First, the asymmetrical treatment of profit and loss resulting from
risk taking (i.e. profits from lucky outcomes are taxed but losses from unlucky outcomes are disregarded)
discourages risk taking. Second, it is difficult to distinguish economic rent from returns to risk taking for
particular firms and investments. When a firm realizes an outsized return, it is generally hard to say how
much this is because the firm seized on an unique opportunity, and how much it is just good luck (it is
usually both). Only by taking full account of losses in the tax system—by allowing full offset of losses
against profit and the refund of negative tax liabilities of individual firms—can one address these two
problems.
However, almost no real world tax systems offer refundable tax credits or cash subsidies for
losses. The reason is not mysterious: it is much easier to lose money than to make money, and any
government should be loath to partake in all the loss opportunities out there. This approach is true not
26

See especially Bradford, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 12-13; Boadway & Tremblay, supra note
5 at 47.
27
A BETTER WAY, at 26.
28
See, e.g. Bradford, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Boadway and Tremblay supra note 5. For recent
reflections on whether this traditional approach is justified, see Robin Boadway, et al 2015. “Cash-Flow Business
Taxation Revisited: Bankruptcy, Risk Aversion and Asymmetric Information.” Oxford Centre for Business Taxation
Working Papers 15/31.
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only of the income tax, but also of the VAT. In this regard, it is easy to be misled by the fact that for a
particular firm, it is possible for VAT input tax credits to exceed VAT payable on sales, with the result
that the firm gets a VAT refund depending on the excess of its cost of input purchases over its sales. One
should not forget that this refund is for the VAT that has previously been charged to the firm on its input
purchases. A VAT refund simply ensures that no tax is collected in excess of the value of a firm’s taxable
sales. It does not require the government to offer a subsidy to any firm when there is a loss. To put it
differently, the VAT taxes consumption even if the consumption is produced through processes
generating net losses.29
In other words, there existed a large gap between the cash flow tax economists wrote about (in
both theoretical and even policy papers) and real world taxes. If the GOP Blueprint’s brief statement
about loss carryforwards is read to apply to exporting firms as well, the legislative proposal can be seen as
beginning to close this gap by eschewing cash grants for losses.30 Nonetheless, there seem to remain some
intolerable gaping holes. It seems to follow from the design of the DCFT that, unless “losses” recorded by
exporters can be freely traded for cash with other businesses,31 no corporation would want to be engaged
purely in exports, since its negative tax base would not result in any tax benefit. All exporters would want
to acquire businesses generating domestic sales, or enter into group consolidation with corporations that
have such sales. This type of behaviors would often be distortionary—they would not occur in the
absence of the potential tax benefits enjoyed by exporters. Moreover, if different businesses use their
losses from exports to different extents, depending on how much taxable profit is generated by their
domestic sales, another dimension of heterogeneity—as well as fluctuation—would be introduced to the
amounts of subsidies received by different exporters.32

29

Cash-flow tax advocates arguably miss this point when they claim similarities—but for the deduction for labor
costs—between real-world VATs and the tax they favor in theory. For example, David Bradford suggested that
under a VAT, any investment outlays are immediately deducted in the computation of VAT liability. As a result,
“the general public shares in the investment and payoffs in proportion to the tax rate [in] making investment
decisions, the taxable firm considers its share.” Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues,
in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 132, 132 (Michael J. Boskin, ed., 1996). This is incorrect: the government simply
does not share the risk of business loss through the VAT.
30
The Report of the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel recommended (under the destination-based Growth and
Investment Tax or GIT) cash subsidies to exporters with excess deductions, even though businesses making
domestic sales would only be able to carry forward losses. 2005 PANEL REPORT, at 171. It acknowledged that
“special rules may be needed to police the allocation of expenses between domestic businesses generating losses and
export businesses when both are operated within the same firm or through affiliates.” I believe this understates the
problem: the opportunities for tax avoidance and even fraud associated with cash subsidies to exporters are bad
enough in themselves, even without considering the strong incentives for tax planning when exporters and domestic
businesses are treated differently.
31
For the government, this would be just as bad as giving cash directly to the exporters. The Report of the 2005
President’s Advisory Panel acknowledges the risks of allowing loss trading under any cash flow tax: “Allowing
tradable or refundable losses may encourage tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayers make investments that
would not have been worth undertaking in a no-tax setting. The value of tax losses created by such an investment
may be a key component of its appeal. In addition, allowing loss trading could make it much more important to
police so-called "hobby losses" and losses generated by various forms of disguised consumption, rather than
investment, because those losses could generate tax savings even when the person incurring them would never
realize offsetting positive cash flow.” 2005 PANEL REPORT”, at 167.
32
In this context, it would become even harder to see how (as DCFT proponents would want us to believe) the
subsidy/tariff apparently present in the DCFT can be neutralized by exchange rate adjustments or labor moving
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The problem of loss utilization would not be nearly as dramatic under an origin-based cash flow
tax that also adopts the loss carryforward with interest. A firm’s sales would always be included in the
base of such a tax. An interest factor attached to losses carried forward would often be adequate to
preserve the value of losses realized, except when a firm liquidates without earning a profit. The nonrefundability of firms’ terminal negative tax liability still deters risk taking to an extent, but this is a
matter of degree, and is not different in kind from the treatment of losses under the current income tax
(which theorists view as non-ideal). By contrast, there has to be some way to give effect to the negative
tax liability associated with all exporters under a DCFT: otherwise it would not be a destination-based tax.
But the choices among direct cash grants for current excess deductions, costless (“safe harbor”) loss
trafficking, and more limited loss utilizations through tax planning all seem to be unpalatable, as well as
unprecedented.
3. Taxing Non-Corporate Entities on a Destination Basis
“The cash-flow based approach that will replace our current income-based approach for taxing
both corporate and non-corporate businesses will be applied on a destination basis.”33 This statement in
the GOP Blueprint confirms what seems an inevitable implication of DCFT proposals, namely that it
must be applied to corporations and non-corporate business entities alike. As a practical matter, it is hard
to imagine corporations being taxed on a destination basis but non-corporate entities on an origin basis. If
corporations are not allowed to deduct the cost of imports but partnerships are, imports would all be done
through partnerships. Partnerships would then on-sell the imported goods to corporations, defeating the
tax on imports. Conversely, all non-corporate entities making export sales—think of law, accounting,
consulting and financial management firms providing services to foreign clients—would all try to make
such sales through corporations, if corporations can exclude export sales from its tax base but noncorporate entities cannot. Moreover, corporations entering into joint ventures that involve making sales of
goods and services across borders would have to rethink whether they would want to do so using noncorporate vehicles.
Although applying the DCFT to corporations makes it practically necessary to apply the same
treatment to non-corporate entities, this fundamental change to the taxation of non-corporate entities
seems otherwise to be lacking in motivation. Because individual owners of sole-proprietorships,
partnerships, etc. are taxed currently on such entities’ income, American taxpayers cannot engage in
deferral planning through such entities. And both because of the United States’ foreign tax credit regime
and because individuals cannot manipulate their tax residence as easily as can corporations, distortions of
residence- and source-based taxation either do not arise or are minimized. Therefore international tax
planning and profit shifting by non-corporate entities taxed on a pass-through basis is not an issue of
serious concern. Consequently, although cash flow taxation does make a difference to all businesses
because of the benefit of immediate expensing (and the detriment of interest non-deductibility), the
destination aspect of DCFT introduces no efficiency gain in the treatment of pass-through entities. Indeed,
according to other tax reform proposals advanced in the U.S., the corporate tax system should be
reformed to align more with the current regime for pass-through taxation, not the other way around.34

across firms and sectors. How flexible does the exchange rate have to be to adjust even on average to such
fluctuations, and how wages reach equilibrium?
33
A BETTER WAY, at 28.
34
See ERIC TODER & ALAN D. VIARD, MAJOR SURGERY NEEDED: A CALL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE U.S.
CORPORATE INCOME TAX 1 (2014).
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One may even question whether the destination-based tax treatment of non-corporate entities is
not positively base-eroding (as well as regressive). Under the DCFT, U.S. lawyers, business consultants,
investment managers and others providing professional services to foreign clients and off-shore
companies would no longer be taxed on the profits when earned from such services—not even under the
reduced 25% rate that the GOP Blueprint proposes for pass-through entities’ active business income.
Instead, they would be taxed on such profits only when, and to the extent, they finance U.S.-based
consumption from such profits.35 Moreover, such firms could have negative tax liabilities after the
deduction of wage costs. What may happen is that, instead of looking for loss-generating tax shelters as
they did in the past, the U.S.’s high income-earning service professionals would be looking to acquire
interests in businesses generating active income, so as to make use of their export-related deductions. This
adds another layer to the loss trafficking problems generated by corporations discussed in the previous
Section. It may also exacerbate pre-existing incentives to convert wages taxed a higher rate (e.g. the 33%
maximum under the Blueprint) to active business income (which can be subject to zero tax if offset by
loss carryforwards).
The preceding discussion assumes that applying the DCFT to non-corporate entities means such
entities computing profits or losses in the same way as corporations do, but are nonetheless not subject to
the DCFT at the entity level. Instead, the owners of non-corporate entities would be subject to tax (at a
maximum 25% rate, according to the GOP Blueprint).36 But arguably this is an incorrect way of thinking
about things. The defining feature of pass-through entities is that their owners are taxed currently on the
entity’s income. Corporations, by contrast, are subject to an entity-level tax, separate from shareholderlevel taxation of dividends and capital gains. This distinction, however, makes sense only in the income
tax context: because corporate shareholders enjoy the benefit of deferral (i.e. no current inclusion), an
entity level tax is needed to undo this benefit. Under any type of cash flow tax applied to corporations
(including the DCFT), however, the entity-level tax no longer has the effect of undoing deferral. This is
because any cash flow tax allows the immediate expensing of all of a firm’s capital investments. A firm
can thus always earn a normal investment return without being subject to tax, and is indifferent between
paying tax earlier and later. Individual shareholders thus enjoy the benefit of perfect deferral on
investments in a firm subject to the cash-flow tax.
What this implies is that it would be very artificial to maintain the distinction between corporate
and pass-through entities—taxing the former both at the entity and owner levels, and taxing the latter only
at the owner levels—if the DCFT were adopted. Indeed all past cash flow tax (or equivalent) proposals
advanced in the U.S. do not take this approach. David Bradford’s “X tax”, for example, is simply a
consumption tax that does not aim to tax shareholders on corporate income.37 More recently, Edward
Kleinbard has proposed the Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT), which explicitly taxes only
economic rent at the firm level, and only the normal return to capital at the investor level.38 The BEIT
serves as a device to measure returns to capital from risk taking and economic rent, instead of the
traditional role of preventing the deferral of income by shareholders. Under both Bradford’s and

35

The fact that U.S. taxpayers can earn investment returns at a low tax rate and then migrate to a low-tax jurisdiction
when they retire and consume is deemed to be a general problem for a destination-based cash flow tax (as compared
with an origin-based income or cash flow tax), and is not specific to owners of pass-through entities. See Bradford,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26-7.
36
This is of course inherently distortionary.
37
Bradford, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
38
Edward D. Kleinbard, Reimagining Capital Income Taxation (paper presented at the Annual Symposium of the
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Saïd Business School, Oxford, UK, June 22, 2015). The BEIT
implements the tax on corporate rent through a cost of capital allowance instead of immediate deductions for capital
expenses, a distinction that is irrelevant for the purposes here.
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Kleinbard’s proposals, owners of corporate and non-corporate entities are taxed alike, as are the two types
of entities themselves.39
By contrast, under the House GOP Blueprint, owners of corporate and non-corporate entities
continue to be subject to different treatments (i.e. two levels vs. one level of taxation), even though this is
no longer justifiable in terms of the entity-level tax that corporations are subject to. An alternative way of
implementing the DCFT should therefore be to tax owners of non-corporate and corporate entities alike:
partners, for example, should be taxed on both distributions and sales of partnership interests, while the
20% DCFT would be imposed at the partnership level. This would at least improve the U.S. tax system in
one way, by eliminating the complexities of pass-through taxations.

4. Progressivity under the DCFT and Possible International Response
The House GOP Blueprint asserts that the DCFT would “allow the United States to adopt, for the
first time in history, the same destination-based approach to taxation that has long been used by our
trading partners. This will end the self-imposed unilateral penalty for exports and subsidy for imports that
are fundamental flaws in the current U.S. tax system.” 40 The comparison made here is puzzling. Most
other OECD countries impose both an origin-based corporate income tax and a destination-based VAT.
Although their corporate income tax rates are generally lower than that of the U.S. (and may be more
“competitive” in other respects), it is their VATs, not their corporate income taxes, that allow for border
adjustments. To say that the DCFT “counters” the U.S.’s trade partners’ VATs at once implies that VATs
involve export subsidies and ignores that other countries maintain origin-based corporate income taxes.
Neither is correct (as can be seen from Table 1 in Section 1).41 Whatever “self-imposed” penalty that is
implicit in the origin-based corporate income tax is shared by the U.S. and its trade partners, thus by no
means “unilateral”. What does distinguish the U.S. is its resistance to adopting the VAT.
To put it differently, if the U.S. simply were to replace its corporate income tax with the
destination-based VAT, the difference that would matter to the rest of the world would not be the U.S.’s
removal of a “self-imposed penalty” (by previously failing to border adjust under an income tax). Instead,
it would be that the U.S. would have eliminated its corporate income tax, while others still maintain such
taxes in addition to having VATs. As far as the taxation of multinationals are concerned, it is hard for a
country to be more competitive than that.42 By the same token, the phenomenon of U.S.-tax-driven MNC
tax planning would certainly end. The business “competitiveness” goals of the GOP Blueprint would all

39

The GIT considered by the Report of the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel applies to corporate and non-corporate
entities in the same way, but owners of the two types of entities are still taxed differently. The GIT is thus vulnerable
to the same criticism directed at the DCFT here.
40
A BETTER WAY, at 15. See also id., at 28 (“For the first time ever, the United States will be able to counter the
border adjustments that our trading partners apply in their VATs.”)
41
To refer back to the example in Table 1, the U.S.’s trade partners each imposes taxes corresponding to Row 4
(except that most of them have origin-based income taxes and not cash-flow taxes) and Row 5 (the VAT), whereas
the U.S. has only had a tax corresponding to Row 4 (against with the caveat that it is not a cash flow tax). Replacing
the corporate income tax with the DCFT would introduce export subsidies (per Row 6 of Table 1) not observed in
Row 5, which depicts the neutrality of the VAT.
42
As the discussion in Section 1 showed, however, the DCFT has a narrower tax base even than the VAT. Replacing
the corporate income tax with a DCFT (without having a VAT at the same time) would certainly be even more
business-favorable than replacing it with a VAT.
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be thoroughly achieved—and, as it happens, the VAT actually would also be WTO-compatible, and free
of the uncertainties of implementability discussed in Sections 2-3.
The new question here is perhaps not why U.S. politicians would not advocate adopting the VAT
(even though the House GOP now seems willing to consider the DCFT). It is instead why the DCFT’s
intellectual proponents would favor it over the VAT. One suggestion that has been aired is that the DCFT
may be more progressive than the VAT.43 The reasoning behind this suggestion is probably the following.
The VAT taxes all consumption, whether the consumption is financed by wage earnings or supra-normal
returns to capital. The DCFT, by contrast, allows wage payments to be deducted from the tax base, and
economists have concluded that this means only consumption that is financed out of supra-normal returns
to capital investment would be taxed.44 If higher income individuals finance a greater proportion of their
consumption from returns to investment rather than from wage earnings, then perhaps a tax on
investment-financed consumption has a built-in progressivity. (Since money is fungible, presumably a
higher proportion of investment-financed consumption simply means a higher proportion of current
disposable income that comes from wealth instead of labor.)
This type of consideration could seem relevant when one considers only business tax reform—
which is what the DCFT’s intellectual proponents have focused on.45 However, its relevance is much
diminished when set out in a reform package that also addresses individual taxation. This is precisely
what the Blueprint has done. According to the Republican proposal, investment income (dividend, capital
gain, and interest) would all be taxed at progressive rates, though effectively at half the rates of other
types of income in the same brackets (through a 50% deduction). This seems to be a far more direct and
effective way of introducing progressivity than modifying the VAT. Whatever progressivity there is in the
DCFT relative to the VAT seems to lose policy significance.
Recognizing that the U.S. is unique among OECD countries in not having a VAT is also relevant
to the question of how other countries might respond to a U.S. DCFT. A basic reason why that question is
presently unanswerable is of course that the DCFT may be WTO-incompatible, and it is unclear, even
putting the WTO aside, whether countries can come to terms with the trade effects of the DCFT.
Moreover, as Section 2 above suggested, the export subsidies required by the DCFT imply mechanisms
for governments to transmit cash to their exporters in ways that are unprecedented in real word tax
systems. But suppose that these problems are somehow overcome. Suppose, for example, the U.S simply
allows unlimited trafficking of losses arising from labor cost deductions from exported sales. Would other
countries follow suit and adopt the DCFT as well?
My own guess is that the answer is No. The reason is that the DCFT is too much just like the
destination-based VAT: the only differences are the deduction for labor costs and the fact that the DCFT
operates on a subtraction as opposed to a credit-invoice method. Other countries already have the VAT,
and there is little justification to impose a separate subtraction-type tax that is also destination-based. To
achieve the effect of the DCFT, they would only have to increase their VAT rates (by the rate of the
desired DCFT), while as the same time adopt some mechanism for giving effect to labor cost deductions.
43

Finley supra note 1.
Auerbach and Devereux, supra note 3.
45
The DCFT’s scholarly advocates have tended to be reticent on what type of individual-level taxation they assume
and how the DCFT relates to such taxation.
44
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They could, for example, offer a deemed input VAT credit (at the rate of the desired DCFT) for all labor
costs incurred by VAT taxpayers. This could undermine the integrity of their VAT systems, in the way
loss trafficking would undermine the integrity of income tax systems. But at least they would not have to
worry about the integrity of their (personal) income tax systems undermined by a substantial new source
of business losses.
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